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In 1996 we wrote in World Development about our concerns
regarding the impact of foreign aid on non-governmental
organizations, arguing that despite donors investing heavily
in development NGOs in order to strengthen good governance
agendas and ﬁnd an eﬃcient channel for ﬁlling gaps in service
delivery, these comparative advantages were based on
ideological grounds rather than evidence. In fact, the increased
dependence of NGOs on donor funding served to undermine
the strengths that justiﬁed an increased role for NGOs in
development (Hulme & Edwards, 1996). That these questions
remain pertinent today was underlined when our recent
working paper on the subject (see Banks & Hulme, 2012)
was criticized by Duncan Green on his From Poverty to Power
blog for being a ‘generalized and ill-informed attack on
NGOs’. The debate that followed, with contributions from
academics, NGO practitioners and interested members of civil
society, was picked up by an article on The Guardian’s Global
Development website, 1 which asked whether a fault-line was
deepening between NGOs that are increasingly vocal about
the problems they face and those who (at least publicly)
remain passive or defensive.
Clearly we are at a point in the NGO debate at which seri-
ous questions are being raised about the ability of NGOs to
meet their long-term goals of social justice and transformation
at a time when the development sector is narrowly focused on
short-term results and value for money. After two decades of
research we are better-positioned to revisit these issues given
the expanding depth and breadth of academic knowledge
about NGOs, but we have yet to ﬁnd a forum through which
to bridge the gap that exists between NGOs and academics on
this contentious subject: a space in which these issues can be
discussed, debated, and deliberated through a process of col-
laboration and creative dialog, rather than through collision,
avoidance, or mutual suspicion.
The NGO landscape has transformed dramatically in scale
and proﬁle since NGOs became prominent actors in develop-
ment after the end of the Cold War. NGOs are bigger, more
numerous and sophisticated, and receive a larger slice of
foreign aid and other forms of development ﬁnance than ever707before (AbouAssi, 2012; Africa, 2013; Brautigam & Segarra
2007; Brown, Brown, & Desposato, 2007b; Clarke, 1998;
Fisher, 1997; Thomas, 2008). Other global transformations
since the late 1990s have also inﬂuenced the capacities and
strategies of NGOs. Rapid globalization and the spread of
market liberalizing reforms across the Global South have led
to the increasing inﬂuence of non-state actors on development
policy and practice. We have also witnessed a staggering rise in
inequality and the concentration of economic and political
power in the hands of a small proportion of the world’s richest
countries and people (Houtzager, 2005). Alongside the roll-
back of welfare states we have seen the emergence of emerging
powers (Brazil, India, and China), emerging middle powers
(South Africa, Turkey, Indonesia, and others), large philan-
throcapitalists and private donors (Herzer & Nunnenkamp,
2013) and new actors and alliances for development (Richey
& Ponte, 2014).
Elsewhere we discuss what these changes have meant for
development, arguing that the entrance of new development
actors remains a mask for maintaining the dominance of free
market capitalism 2 and that goals of transformative social jus-
tice remain far-removed (Banks & Hulme, 2014). Here we
return to our earlier questions to see whether these changes
have enabled NGOs to better contest hegemonic corporate
interests and drive structural change. The arguments presented
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their activities by three researchers who have been teaching,
researching and/or working in the NGO sector since the
1996 paper was published. The literature on NGOs and civil
society has expanded dramatically in this time, but we believe
its general direction supports our initial concerns: as a result of
internal and external pressures, most NGO eﬀorts remain pal-
liative rather than transformative. Earlier predictions that the
gradual erosion of aid would liberate NGOs and allow them to
return to their earlier roots have not been realized, and many
seem to lack the urgency, foresight, and courage to move out
of the comfort zone in which they have found themselves
(Fowler, 2000a, 2000b). However, NGOs are only one, albeit
important, actor in civil society. When it comes to realizing
goals of empowerment, social justice, and transformation we
must be careful to distinguish between NGOs and other civil
society organizations such as labor unions or social move-
ments which act in, and are aﬀected by, the politics of develop-
ment in diﬀerent ways (Clarke, 1998; Fisher, 1997; Mercer,
2002; Pearce, 1993; Uphoﬀ, 1993). While we do not attempt
to solve the unanswerable question of deﬁning development
NGOs in a way that captures the heterogeneity that exists
across them, we believe that distinguishing between intermedi-
ary NGOs and membership-based civil society organizations is
the key diﬀerentiation to make in understanding the limited
progress that development NGOs have made in the arena of
social change.
In illustrating this we explore three key issues that have been
drawn into sharper focus and help to explain why there has
been so little change in the NGO community over the past
two decades. The ﬁrst concerns the weak roots of the majority
of NGOs in civil society in the countries they work in and in
which they generate resources, a weakness which greatly limits
their impact and inﬂuence over the drivers of social change.
The second concerns the rising tide of technocracy that has
swept through the world of foreign aid over the last 10 years,
which has driven NGOs as “clients” to work on a limited set
of agendas biased toward service-delivery and “democracy-
promotion” instead of the deep-rooted transformation of pol-
itics, social relations, markets, and technology. In doing so it
has threatened to erode the vibrant civil society necessary
for structural change (Choudry & Kapoor, 2013). The third
is the national and international political environments which
continue to constrain NGO activities. We also discuss how
NGOs have tried to overcome some of these obstacles through
‘strategic stealth’, building partnerships with governments and
other NGOs in order to build voice and illustrate alternative
forms of service delivery. We conclude by exploring possibili-
ties for using the traditional strengths of NGOs as intermedi-
aries to build bridges between more locally rooted grassroots
organizations and local and national levels, and to apply their
knowledge of local contexts in an increasingly inter-connected
world.
The classiﬁcation problem of NGOs on theoretical and
empirical fronts (Vakil, 1997) remains. While generalizing
about NGOs as a “sector” is problematic, we believe that
some degree of generalization is inevitable since the rise to
prominence of development NGOs has itself been based on
a set of general arguments about their strengths and distinctive
competences as providers of ‘development alternatives’ that
oﬀer more people-centered and grassroots-driven approaches
to development (Drabek, 1987). If we can justify a sector on
the basis of shared strengths and objectives, we must also be
able to explore and assess its achievements in this way
(Bebbington, 2004; Tvedt, 2006). 3 This means that in our dis-
cussion of NGOs we refer to development NGOs whose goalsgo beyond service delivery to include transformative missions
of empowerment and social justice. 4 One important distinc-
tion we need to make when assessing transformative potential
is between development NGOs and membership-based organi-
zations. As the following section outlines, NGOs lack some of
the deﬁning attributes of membership-based organizations.
Despite the important role they continue to play, this has lim-
ited the role that NGOs can play as countervailing powers
against dominant state and market interests.2. NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY
When it comes to safeguarding, protecting, and promoting
the position of marginalized or excluded groups, civil society
– the space in which people mobilize to bargain, negotiate,
or coerce other actors in order to advance and promote their
interests – is key. The global development agenda has shifted
markedly over the past three decades, placing diﬀerent empha-
ses on the relative roles of the state, the market, and civil soci-
ety according to the ideologies underpinning the development
agenda at each speciﬁc time (Hulme, 2013). Large-scale reduc-
tions in public expenditures and state-provided services along-
side displeasure at the perceived failures of ‘top-down’
development opened up new spaces for NGO growth and
expansion in the 1980s and 1990s. Viewed favorably for their
ability to connect with beneﬁciaries and their role as innova-
tors in working with the poor, NGOs became the new “sweet-
hearts” of development (Barr, Fafchamps, & Owens, 2005;
Gill, 1997; Hearn, 2007; Kamat, 2004; Lewis, 2005; Murray
& Overton, 2011).
The withdrawal of structural adjustment programs from the
mid-1990s onward marked another shift, returning the state’s
role in development back to center stage, but this time with an
explicit focus on ‘good governance’. While this ‘re-governmen-
talization’ of aid drew attention away from NGOs, the lan-
guage of democracy, human rights, participation and
“strengthening civil society” that accompanied it consolidated
their role as proxies for broader processes of citizen engage-
ment that would enable them to act as a countervailing power
against local and national governments (Lewis & Kanji, 2009;
Murray & Overton, 2011). As we will discuss, the extent to
which NGOs have opened up this space remains questionable
given the diﬃculties they face realizing their civil society func-
tions.
Although recognizing the need for a vibrant civil society, the
donor community’s narrow emphasis on NGOs and ‘results’
has curtailed its eﬀectiveness when it comes to facilitating
transformative development. Aid has enabled NGOs to
expand access to services among marginalized and excluded
groups, but this has been through channels that are weakly
connected to deeper processes of political, economic, and
structural change in which marginalized or excluded groups
search for alternative ways of organizing the economy, poli-
tics, and social relations (Mercer, 2002; Mitlin, Hickey, &
Bebbington, 2007; Rahman, 2006; Wiktorowicz, 2002).
Despite using their identity as civil society organizations to
consolidate their legitimacy, NGOs in Bangladesh, for exam-
ple, have increasingly divorced themselves from their civil soci-
ety roots (Lewis, 2004; Rahman, 2006; White, 1999). In the
growth of funding to NGOs in order to foster a ‘vibrant’ civil
society, civil society has been treated as political magic bullet
without a nuanced understanding of how it ﬁts into a more
complex network of relationships with the state, political par-
ties, and citizens within diverse country contexts (Sabatini,
2002).
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the term with professional NGOs who can master the donors’
terminology and ways of working, and who can satisfy strict
accountability processes to governments, Northern NGOs,
philanthropists, and other non-traditional donors (Fowler,
2000a, 2000b; Mohan, 2002; White, 1999). Despite their per-
ceived advantages as grassroots-oriented ‘democratizers of
development’ (Bebbington, 1997, 2005), NGOs face signiﬁcant
constraints and contradictions in their ability to strengthen
civil society given the pressures they face to be non-political,
their weak roots in society, the pressures they face to be
accountable “upward” to donors rather than “downward” to
beneﬁciaries, and their focus on short-term projects rather
than long-term structural change (Dicklitch & Lwanga,
2003; Fowler, 2000a, 2000b; Fyvie & Ager, 1999; Jalali,
2013; Lang, 2013; Mohan, 2002). These pressures have
enabled NGOs to excel in their service delivery function. But
as we argue here, this has come at the expense of their civil
society function, which remains key to NGO legitimacy. It is
these characteristics that separate most NGOs from other
forms of indigenous civil society entities, as Table 1 illustrates.
We refer to as membership-based organizations (MBOs) more
traditional forms of civil society organizations such as social
movements, political, or religious institutions, trade unions,
cooperatives, small self-help groups, and campaigning organi-
zations, among others (Chen, Jhabvala, Kanbur, & Richards,
2007). Research on NGOs has been limited when it comes
both to the experiences of social movements and the ‘solidarity
NGOs’ that support them, the latter which tend to be smaller,
less formal, and more politically radical than most NGOs
involved in international development (Andrews, 2014).
As Table 1 highlights (admittedly using distinctions that are
drawn too sharply in order to emphasize the point), NGOs are
fundamentally diﬀerent to progressive indigenously formed
MBOs. Their civil society functions are central to MBO activ-
ities, which often challenge the state and other vested interests.
They are formed and gain strength from their grassroots mem-
bership, and are accountable to their members in terms of
their strategies, programs, and activities, all of which serve
the fundamental purpose of leveraging improved terms of rec-
ognition for group members and advancing their interests.
MBOs can respond to the needs and aspirations of their mem-
bers because they are accountable both inward (leaders are
elected) and outward (leaders represent their constituencies)
(Chen et al., 2007). In contrast, NGOs lack the same ability
to act as a countervailing power given their lack of member-
ship, representation, and weak links to grassroots constitu-
ents. As we expand on in our concluding section, the
question NGOs need to ask themselves is how they can better
situate themselves to work in support of MBOs in their eﬀorts
to act as a countervailing power to more powerful actors.
More radical perspectives argue that increasing support
for NGOs and the subsequent ‘NGOization’ of development
has served to undermine local and national movements inTable 1. Contrasting orientations an
Membership-based organizatio
Relationship with the State Oppositional
Constituents Members
Accountable to Members
Program design Demand-side approach
Community participation Political
Strategy Development as leverage
Development ideology Development as social, political and econ
Tackling/addressing Root causes of povertycomplicity with state and private sector interests (Choudry &
Kapoor, 2013). The need to act in accordance with the rules
of the ‘development marketplace’ means that NGOs are closer
in kind to socially responsible market actors than to civil-
society organizations. Consequently, the dramatic expansion
of the NGO sector over the past three decades has rarely been
accompanied by a stronger, more vibrant civil society that can
generate transformative change by tackling issues of power
and inequality head-on. Whether the NGO explosion is an
indicator of revitalized democracies across the globe, or is
undermining the very foundations of representative democracy
they seek to promote is therefore at question (Lang, 2013). In
Pakistan, Bano (2008, 2012) reveals how and why donor
ﬁnancing breaks down the institutions for collective action
that it claims to promote by eroding the attributes and
characteristics that generate membership and support for the
organizations. She argues that in their quest to strengthen civil
society organizations, donors have used incorrect assumptions
about why people choose to cooperate in groups, which
include collective interest, trust, and ultimately, faith in the
group leadership’s intentions, motivations, and commitments
to the cause. 5
Donor funding risks de-linking civil society groups from the
broader political and party system and transforming confron-
tational movements into consensus movements with weak
roots in the community (Jalali, 2013). While local communities
are more likely to judge the organizations they support
according to their causes and leadership, the current aid archi-
tecture prioritizes particular, tangible structures built around
formal, professionalized organizations (Lewis, 2013; Smits &
Wright, 2012). This subsequent depoliticization of civil society
organizations encourages them to adopt moderate positions
and professionalize rather than to maintain deep linkages with
social movements and other forms of MBO (Carothers & de
Gramont, 2013). Case studies in Latin America and Indonesia
highlight that this means despite regarding marginalized peo-
ple as their constituency, membership of democracy-promot-
ing NGOs remain conﬁned to educated staﬀ members rather
than volunteers or activists, weakening their societal links
and eroding prospects for downward accountability
(Bebbington, 1997; Kamstra, Knippenberg, & Schulpen,
2013; Lang, 2013; Sabatini, 2002).
Paradoxically, therefore, civil society may be best nurtured
when donors do less: stepping back to allow citizen groups
themselves to dictate the agenda and to evolve structures that
suit their concerns and contexts (Edwards, 2011a). This does
not mean that NGOs have no role in promoting citizen
action, but it does mean that they must step back and see
themselves in a diﬀerent light in relation to this role, becoming
more supportive of the independent action of other, more
embedded groups in the societies where they work and raise
resources. The next section further explores NGO legitimacy
through assessing their ability to live up to their comparative
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Are NGOs purveyors or facilitators of ‘development alter-
natives’? To answer this question requires a deﬁnition of
‘development’. As we have seen, the initial ‘rise of NGOs’
was partly based on their assumed ability to ﬁll gaps in ser-
vice-delivery as well as on their ability to challenge unequal
relationships and pursue transformative agendas through their
people-centered approaches. We can call these their “service
delivery functions” and their “civil society functions” respec-
tively (with individual NGOs displaying a mixture of these
two functions to varying extents). The visions and missions
of NGOs – which some have referred to as their ‘moral cru-
sade against poverty’ (Makuwira, 2014) – usually focus more
on the latter, particularly their desire to ‘empower’ poor and
marginalized groups through their activities. But in part
because of their weak civil society roots and in part due to
external pressures to act in this way, there is a mismatch
between these visions and the ability of NGOs to inﬂuence
the drivers of social change through their programs.
Constraints from all sides have led many NGOs to prioritize
their role as service providers at the expense of their civil soci-
ety functions. This has led to a prolonged crisis in which
NGOs have found themselves increasingly pulled further away
the poor groups that they claim to represent and in whose
name many now raise huge funds (Wallace & Porter, 2013).
Many authors – and some NGOs and donors themselves –
have subsequently revisited the comparative advantages on
which their legitimacy rests (Edwards, 2008; Holmen &
Jirstrom, 2009; Mitlin et al., 2007; Rahman, 2006; Shutt,
2009; Smits & Wright, 2012; Wallace & Porter, 2013). As we
discuss in the following sections, high levels of dependency
on external funding and the pressures of working within
restrictive national rules and regulations act as severe con-
straints on the transformative potential of NGOs.
(a) Grassroots orientation
Grassroots linkages and close proximity to beneﬁciaries are
seen to give NGOs a comparative advantage in providing eﬀec-
tive, targeted aid and ensuring that programs are designed in a
bottom-up manner reﬂecting local contexts, needs, and realities
and are not subject to commercial or political capture (Koch,
Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2009). Given the centrality
of this to their perceived legitimacy, early proponents fore-
warned NGOs not to “forget their grassroots origins and links,
the basis of their greatest strength” (Drabek, 1987, p. ix). This,
however, remains incompatible with imperatives of organiza-
tional survival and growth in an aid architecture dominated
by a heavy reliance on donor funding. This has led to a strong
shift in relationships between NGOs and donors, the state and
their beneﬁciaries, which continues today. Despite the close
relationship between NGOs and their beneﬁciaries being the
most salient source of NGO legitimacy and of facilitating
transformative outcomes, this is generally what they set aside
in favor of operational eﬃciency and policy inﬂuence and in
response to donor requirements (Kilby, 2006; Lang, 2013).
Contrary to popular perceptions, NGOs face signiﬁcant dif-
ﬁculties in tailoring programs to local needs. A competitive
funding environment means that their strategies must align
with donor priorities and interests (Ebrahim, 2003; Elbers &
Arts, 2011; Epstein & Gang, 2006; Fowler, 2000a, 2000b;
Gill, 1997; Mohan, 2002; Tvedt, 2006). In Malawi, donor pri-
oritization of HIV/AIDS has led to the decline or disappear-
ance of other priorities – much to the frustration of many
NGOs there (Simon Morﬁt, 2011). Likewise, AbouAssi(2012) explores how environmental NGOs in Lebanon shifted
their programmatic focus to adapt to changing donor priori-
ties. 6 In Tanzania, too, Levine (2002) ﬁnds strategic shifts
among national conservation NGOs in line with priorities of
international development agencies. Tensions between the dif-
ferent priorities of donors and the Zapatista movement in
Mexico also illustrate how donor requirements prevent NGOs
from prioritizing the grassroots. As the movement grew stron-
ger, it demanded greater participation in program design and
oversight and a shift in priorities away from gender to eco-
nomic development (Andrews, 2014). NGOs who were unable
to meet these demands (because they lacked alternative fund-
ing sources) were forced to drop out of their support role as a
result of donor pressures to keep programs aligned with their
priorities (Andrews, 2014). As Bebbington (1997, p. 1759)
highlights, the external determination of local agendas implies
a shift in the nature of NGOs, ‘turning [them] – at least within
the realms of these contracts – into a subcontracted develop-
ment consultancy’. Development ﬁnancing also has a strong
geographical inﬂuence. Cross-country studies of international
NGOs (INGOs) ﬁnd that neither poverty nor governance
explains their choice of location (Koch, 2007; Koch et al.,
2009). Instead, INGOs become tightly clustered in countries
where donors are located, resulting in and reinforcing the
‘donor darling–donor orphan’ divide. Convenience in terms
of access to beneﬁciaries, donors, and elite goods has also been
found to have a strong inﬂuence on NGO location in Kenya
(Brass, 2012a) and Mexico (Andrews, 2014). 7
The strong focus of donors on material deprivation and
health has pushed NGOs away from a broader deﬁnition of
development that recognizes the centrality of social and eco-
nomic transformations in capabilities and capacities (Chang,
2011). This means that NGOs have been incentivized to pur-
sue their service delivery functions at the expense of their civil
society functions. Given their dependence on donor funds
increasingly demanding measurable ‘results’, NGOs must pri-
oritize their functional accountability to donors (in terms of
targets and outputs) over their broader goals of empowerment
for poor or marginalized groups. We see, therefore, that the
aid system continues to overlook the systems, processes, and
institutions that reproduce poverty and inequality, and has
eﬀectively depoliticized and professionalized development
(Atack, 1999; Lewis, 2013; Mitlin et al., 2007; Power,
Maury, & Maury, 2002). Increasing professionalization has
led to multiple undesirable consequences. Participatory
approaches have been eroded or depoliticized, cultural sensi-
tivity has been reduced, local ties have been weakened, and
ultimately, core values have been diluted as NGOs become
the implementers of donor policy rather than independent
actors (Elbers & Arts, 2011). As Balboa (2014) details in
Papua New Guinea, the attributes that make transnational
NGOs successful in mobilizing large sums of funding and
inﬂuencing policy at the same time set them up for failure
when it comes to creating lasting, meaningful, and context-
speciﬁc change on the ground. The paradox lies in the fact that
the global capacities they require to reach these levels of suc-
cess draws them away from the local bridging capacities they
need for successful operations on the ground (Balboa, 2014).
Decades on from recognizing the important role of grass-
roots-driven and participatory development programs, this
explains why successes have rarely stretched beyond expansion
in service delivery to build capacities for collective action
(World Bank, 2012). Models that assume that poverty can
be eliminated by increased access to resources have little
impact on the underlying structures and processes that under-
pin unequal access in the ﬁrst place.
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culties they face fulﬁlling their civil society functions, NGOs
can act as ‘schools of democracy’ by providing resources
and opportunities for association and collective action, miti-
gating societal conﬂicts, expanding political participation
and providing channels of interest representation (Boulding,
2010; Brown, Brown, & Desposato, 2007a; Clarke, 1998;
Fearon, Humphreys, & Weinstein, 2011; Heinrich, 2001;
Moehler, 2010). This goes back to Bratton’s (1989) arguments
that NGOs boost civil society through their participatory
approach, assuming a linear model in which NGOs provide
a channel for representing excluded groups and integrating
them into political systems (Heinrich, 2001; Mercer, 2002;
Thomas, 2008).
Academic research has traditionally overlooked the political
character of NGOs given their focus on their activities as
social development agencies (Clarke, 1998). A body of more
recent evidence assesses the positive impact of NGOs on gov-
ernance outcomes (Boulding, 2010; Boulding & Gibson, 2009;
Brown et al., 2007a, 2007b; Fearon et al., 2011; Moehler,
2010). Studies in Brazil, Bolivia, and South Africa highlight
the role of NGOs in inﬂuencing democracy. Evaluations of a
community development program in Bolivia and Brazil, for
example, conclude that NGO programs promote democracy
through increasing community-level interactions, promoting
social capital, and inﬂuencing voting behaviors (Boulding &
Gibson, 2009; Brown et al., 2007a, 2007b). Other research in
Central America, however, highlights that social capital does
not automatically translate into political capital, which is a
necessary condition for inﬂuencing democratic outcomes
(Booth & Richard, 1998). In Bolivia, Boulding (2010) ﬁnds
that NGO activity is associated with increased protests in
weakly democratic settings, but has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on voter turnout (Boulding, 2010).
These mixed ﬁndings mean that we must exercise caution
in drawing conclusions, paying attention to the historical
context at play and the mechanisms through which demo-
cratic change is promoted. Studies which illustrate improved
democratic outcomes in Brazil, for example, took place in a
region that beneﬁted from a relatively open political environ-
ment and a strong history of leftist groups and grassroots
mobilization. Program design adopted a participatory
hands-oﬀ approach, leaving administrative and creative con-
siderations to local actors (Brown et al., 2007b). 8 Research
in South Africa, where civil society organizations have his-
torically operated in opposition to apartheid, also highlights
the democracy-promoting role of NGOs (Hearn, 2000;
Heinrich, 2001). Looking closely at the processes through
which role is activated, however, we see an important distinc-
tion between NGOs and MBOs when it comes to meeting
their civil society functions. Despite referring to the full sam-
ple of civil society organizations in Heinrich’s (2001) study of
NGOs in South Africa as ‘NGOs’, one-third of the sample
were membership-based organizations relying heavily on vol-
untary staﬀ (Heinrich, 2001). Without the inward account-
ability that such membership enables, the study argues
that, “their role as schools of democracy does not relate so
much to their members, as to stakeholders and clients”
(Heinrich, 2001, p. 8). This is further illustrated if we com-
pare the South African experience to neighboring countries.
Few civil society organizations in Eastern and Southern
Africa (outside South Africa) have mass membership or
democratic structures that enable inward accountability,
and this has led to limited success for NGOs in challenging
state–society relations and promoting democracy across these
regions (Fowler, 2008; Hearn, 2000).Even those studies that argue for the democracy-promoting
role of NGOs highlight that this is dependent on an enabling
environment, a history of grassroots mobilization, inward
accountability to members, and politicized forms of participa-
tion. Where these contexts and attributes are not present, stud-
ies ﬁnd the opposite: in many cases NGOs have struggled to
promote democratic outcomes through their activities
(Clarke, 1998; Crouch, 2004; Hearn, 2000; Lewis, 2013;
Rahman, 2006; Scholzman, Verba, & Brady, 2013). Despite
the proliferation of NGOs in Bangladesh over several decades
(including several large indigenous NGOs), the country has
witnessed the gradual erosion of democratic norms and insti-
tutions (Lewis, 2004; Rahman, 2006; Stiles, 2002). Kabeer,
Mahmud, and Castro (2012) highlight that impressive devel-
opmental outcomes have not been accompanied by improved
governance outcomes because of increasing homogenization
of NGOs around service delivery and a subsequent shift away
from social mobilization. 9 In the US, Scholzman et al. (2013)
draw upon 25 years of data to highlight that despite a prolif-
eration in organized interest associations, political inequalities
in voice and representation persist (Scholzman et al., 2013).
Crouch (2004) discusses the emergence of ‘post-democratic
societies’, where the institutions of democracy may remain,
but the ability of powerful groups to distort democracy has
meant that these institutions are becoming mere shells, leading
to disillusionment and apathy among the citizens whom
democracy was meant to empower. Rather acting as a coun-
tervailing power to dominant state and private sector interests,
democracy in liberal states has created adherence to the rules
of the game, allowing exploitative social, political, and eco-
nomic systems to continue (Clarke, 1998; Hearn, 2000).
The ability of NGOs to promote democracy is dependent on
processes that begin with and gain strength from grassroots
mobilization and associationalization. These processes hinge
on participation from, and accountability to, members. When
it comes to participation, however, the donor community has
embraced a ‘democratic development paradigm’ that repre-
sents a linear model through which participation for marginal-
ized groups leads to representation and ultimately
empowerment (Heinrich, 2001; Thomas, 2008). We have to
look beyond this linear assumption to explore the extent to
which NGOs are actually connected to the groups they claim
to represent, and to which their programs and activities are
directed (Harding, 2013; Wallace & Porter, 2013). A recent
10-year study of ‘participation’ in World Bank projects, for
example, highlights that while fostering community participa-
tion has achieved success in service delivery, it has been less
eﬀective in reducing poverty or building capacity for collective
action (World Bank, 2012). Participation can only constitute
political action when it attempts to change the underlying
structures and processes underlying limited and unequal
access.
Alongside weak links with the grassroots where they lack a
strong membership base, NGOs are also constrained by state
control of the regulatory environment. This shapes the space
available to civil society organizations and, along with it, the
limits to what can be achieved (Houtzager, 2005). A heavy
focus on service delivery among NGOs must also be seen as
a response by NGOs to political climates hostile to civil society
activism (Rahman, 2006). The regulatory environments facing
NGOs across the Global South commonly provide a hostile,
fast-moving, and complex challenge to their activities
(Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; Jalali, 2013; Wiktorowicz,
2002). Where governments equate civil society with political
opposition and create regulations to dampen or repress civil
society, NGOs face severe limitations on their ability to act
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ple, regulations forbid NGOs receiving more than 10% of their
income from abroad from doing any form of advocacy and
human-rights work (Lang, 2013). Several organizations in
Bangladesh have paid a heavy price for challenging the state.
The collapse of highly politicized NGOs that have actively
engaged in democracy promotion and politics serves as warn-
ing to other NGOs seeking to stray into more democratic
areas (Ulvila & Hossain, 2002). More recently, accusations
of corruption and the forced resignation of Mohammed Yun-
us from the Grameen Bank – although publicly declared in the
public interest to abide by the country’s retirement laws – are
widely recognized as a government response to his post-Nobel
prize attempts to create a ‘people’s’ political party to foster
change in the country’s political culture, and to build a ‘new
Bangladesh.’
Such regulations restrict the abilities of sponsors to fund
contentious programs or priorities. This means that in places
like Ghana and Indonesia, NGOs implement broadly the same
institutional advocacy tactics regardless of whether they are
seeking to challenge poverty and exclusion or corruption
and human rights (Kamstra et al., 2013). 10 It also means that
programs tend to focus on less confrontational priorities. 11
Instead, given the hostility NGOs provoke by intervening in
democracy-building or vocalizing challenges to government,
they must persuade the state that they are non-political – a sig-
niﬁcant challenge when trying to advance the interests of ben-
eﬁciaries in a highly political arena (Bukenya & Hickey, 2014;
Dicklitch & Lwanga, 2003; Ghosh, 2009).
Prioritizing their functional capacities and service delivery
roles has led to many NGOs working in partnership with gov-
ernments through forming strategic alliances. This oﬀers pos-
sibilities for NGOs to free themselves of donor inﬂuence and
harness national resources (Makuwira, 2014). We can see this
to some extent as an opportunity for NGOs to pursue their
civil society functions through stealth rather than contesta-
tion, demonstrating through partnerships strategies for more
eﬀective and democratic service provision (Batley, 2011;
Rose, 2011). 12 NGOs in Kenya, for example, have become
increasingly integrated into governance in terms of seats on
policymaking committees and participation in planning and
budgeting (Brass, 2012b). This constitutes a two-way process
of social learning. Partnerships oﬀer the chance for govern-
ments to consult actively with NGOs about development
problems and solutions, to create institutions that formalize
joint activities and to jointly design and implement develop-
ment policies and programs, all of which may encourage gov-
ernments to learn from NGO approaches (Batley & Rose,
2011; Brass, 2012b; Brautigam & Segarra, 2007). For NGOs,
they represent an opportunity to enhance their voice, inﬂu-
ence, and access to state resources, as well as to craft a more
supportive regulatory environment, a forum for creating a
national discourse on sensitive topics and an alternative route
to confrontation through which they can represent or advo-
cate for poor and excluded groups (Batley & Rose, 2011;
Brautigam & Segarra, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2002). Returning
to Table 1, we can see that the entry point of this approach
falls between the two extremes of ‘development as leverage’
and ‘development as service delivery’. It views service delivery
as a route through which leverage can be facilitated, illustrat-
ing a strategy of transformation by stealth. To these ends,
NGOs can make a conscious decision to sacriﬁce autonomy
in exchange for increased leverage and inﬂuence within gov-
ernment policy and practice (Batley, 2011).
Such partnerships illustrate one avenue through which
NGOs are actively trying to overcome the structuralconstraints that face them, by adopting strategies that balance
the need for ﬁnancial survival, the defense of their organiza-
tional identities and commitment to goals (Batley & Rose,
2011). 13 Yet at the same time they highlight a radical change
in relationships between political institutions, NGOs, and the
broader institutions of civil society. By aligning more closely
with governments, NGOs risk being drawn further away from
their intended beneﬁciaries. The new level of professionaliza-
tion and the positive relationships with the state that these
partnerships require further concentrates power in the hands
of administrators and implementers (Brautigam & Segarra,
2007; Jad, 2007; Ulvila & Hossain, 2002; White, 1999).
Awareness of the dangers and politics of co-optation is
therefore critical. As we reaﬃrm in our conclusions, the
question to be asked is how NGOs can act as successful bridge
builders without eroding their downward accountability.
If NGOs are going to be game changers of democracy,
assessing performance only on their functional mission is not
suﬃcient to legitimize their work (Lang, 2013). They must
move away from the narrow focus on institutional advocacy
that has been prioritized – lobbying to inﬂuence elites and nur-
ture relationships with the state to gain some degree of insider
status – toward a deeper engagement with broader politics
through public advocacy, employing innovative strategies for
communicating with and amplifying citizen voices (Choudry
& Kapoor, 2013; Lang, 2013). It is clear that external pres-
sures from both donors and governments continue to draw
NGOs away from a grassroots orientation. Earlier idealistic
perceptions that assumed that NGO service delivery activities
could foster ‘empowerment’ and democracy promotion are
now recognized as generous and context-speciﬁc, conditional
on grassroots mobilization and membership, internal demo-
cratic processes, and political forms of participation in pro-
gram design and implementation. These same pressures also
undermine NGO innovation, another comparative advantage
on which NGO legitimacy is founded.
(b) Innovation
The innovative and experimental nature of NGOs is said to
be central to their eﬀectiveness, enabling them to ﬁnd new ways
of reaching previously excluded groups. From the 1990s,
research has highlighted the internal and external factors con-
straining NGO innovation, leaving most NGO programs and
activities to fall into a ‘predictable range’ of activities varying
little by organization, sector or country (Fyvie & Ager, 1999;
Kamstra et al., 2013). While early criticism of the limited
impact of NGO activities led to an increased focus on ‘scal-
ing-up,’ capacity-building and partnerships (Lewis, 2005),
these changes pose a threat to innovation because they imply
a shift away from local experiments to models (or ‘silver bul-
lets’) that can be extrapolated from best practices and imple-
mented elsewhere regardless of context (Atack, 1999; Balboa,
2014; Korten, 1990). Risk-averseness among donors also
means that funds are channeled predominantly through large,
international NGOs to formal NGOs that are rarely innovative
(Smits &Wright, 2012). Donor expectations and their demands
for measurable outcomes within short and pre-speciﬁed time
frames are ultimately incompatible with innovation, which
requires a fundamentally diﬀerent approach to development
that is “ﬂexible, long-term, self-critical, and strongly infused
with a spirit of learning by doing” (World Bank, 2012). The
challenge for NGOs should be to expand their impact, not to
replicate or scale up standard interventions.
Of course, few would question the hugely important roles
that NGOs have played in vaccinating millions of children,
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tion, and distributing essential drugs. But herein lies a paradox.
As NGOs have grown in size and sophistication, expanding the
number and breadth of their programs and setting increasingly
ambitious targets, they have become professional organiza-
tions deﬁned in terms of the qualities required to manage the
delivery of development-related services using standard cost–
beneﬁt calculations. “Professionalization” is not, of course,
necessarily a bad thing. It is vital when it comes to working
at scale, building a solid reputation and establishing political
relationships – all of which are critical to success. But neither
is it as an unqualiﬁed good, because it results in signiﬁcant ten-
sions between NGO activities and their overarchingmission for
lasting change, which requires a qualitatively diﬀerent set of
capacities, relationships, and metrics.
Should we be surprised at the level of this mismatch? If NGO
programs have largely ﬁxated on speed, growth, numbers, and
material success, then it would be unrealistic to expect them to
provide a strong platform for addressing the increasingly com-
plex, politicized, and unpredictable problems that characterize
the societies they inhabit (Edwards, 2011b). If anything, the
beginning of the 21st Century has been characterized by the
shrinking room for maneuver that exists for NGOs and their
cooptation into the international aid system (Fowler, 2011;
Townsend, Porter, & Mawdsley, 2004). Ultimately, the inabil-
ity and/or unwillingness of NGOs to fulﬁll their perceived
advantages in terms of innovation, grassroots orientation,
and accountability undermines their legitimacy as ‘develop-
ment alternatives’ and their ability to tackle structurally
entrenched forms of poverty and dispossession. Returning to
Table 1 this reiterates the limitations faced by development
NGOs in fulﬁlling their society functions where they lack a
strong membership base and inward accountability. So long
as these issues remain un-addressed, their leverage over the
long-run drivers of development and social change – and their
ultimate impact – will be weak (Edwards, 2008; Mitlin et al.,
2007). Howmight NGOs approach this challenge in the future?4. NGOS AS BRIDGES TO THE FUTURE
Despite the concerns we outline about the ability of NGOs
to function as political actors and incubators of alternative
development, opportunities for pursuing development that
contributes to progressive political outcomes still exist
(Bukenya & Hickey, 2014). Even within the constraints
imposed on NGOs by the structures and systems they ﬁnd
themselves in, the diversity of form we see emerging is indica-
tive of attempts to avoid these pressures and to retain (or
return to) their original ‘roots’ as agents of the poor.
In a world that is increasingly integrated and connected, the
intermediary position that deﬁnes most NGOs remains a sig-
niﬁcant advantage as they continue striving to demonstrate
what works for poverty reduction. Their ability to build links,
coordinate between sectors, and apply their knowledge of
local contexts mean that NGOs could strengthen their roles
in social transformation even as delivery functions decline
(Edwards, 2011b; Smits & Wright, 2012). This requires, how-
ever, that NGOs position themselves in diﬀerent ways by step-
ping away from the ‘driving seat’ of resource ﬂows and their
associated agendas to become supporters and facilitators of
more deeply networked social action in which other groups
pursue their own goals with the appropriate kinds of support
– whether capacity-building, learning and knowledge creation,
resource-generation, institutional linkages or communications.
NGOs do not, from this position, act themselves as a counter-vailing power to the state and market, but position themselves
in a support role to more locally rooted MBOs. Through this
they can strengthen community eﬀorts, provide technical and
logistical support, and act as gatekeepers bridging the gap
between MBOs and local and national governments.
Small numbers of professional organizations or individuals
working diligently cannot, on their own, facilitate political
change. 14 But NGOs can support the broader processes of
social and political mobilization necessary for linking grass-
roots activities with development ﬁnance and broader advo-
cacy struggles at national and international levels (Kilby,
2006; Kunreuther, 2011). As Mitlin et al. (2007) highlight,
returning to their roots requires NGOs to demonstrate a
greater interest in the political economy of social change,
and to recognize that where NGOs have been genuinely suc-
cessful in realizing their goals of acting as genuine develop-
ment alternatives, it has usually been in conjunction with the
political programs of social movements or developmental
states. Despite the limitations to professionally led develop-
ment solutions, alternative models cannot exclude this profes-
sional support (Mitlin, 2013). Civil society on its own is not
enough. Given the concentration of economic and political
power, “. . .suggestions that the foundation of poverty reduc-
tion is self-organization at the community-level seem at best
hopefully naı¨ve” (Houtzager, 2005, p. 6). Its pluralism and
fragmentation may provide a core strength of civil society
but also its weakness, spreading power thinly and limiting its
ability to contest political and economic power eﬀectively
(Houtzager, 2005).
The ability of NGOs to bridge some of these divides,
strengthen and consolidate otherwise fragmented associations,
and provide legitimacy to grassroots groups through their sup-
port are strong comparative advantages that NGOs oﬀer.
Some see this move as a natural progression as NGOs con-
tinue to adapt to changing institutional environments, such
as Korten’s (1990) ‘fourth generation’ strategy that links
NGOs with social movements to combine local action with
activities at other levels that are aimed at long-term structural
change. In the Philippines, for example, Racelis (2008) high-
lights how ‘People’s Organizations,’ supported by their
NGO partners, have generated local priorities and broadened
democratic spaces through mobilizing, taking action, and
engaging in advocacy for social and political reforms.
Achievements have been incremental as well as transforma-
tive, including agrarian reform; urban land reform; and new
legislations promoting women’s rights and environmental pro-
tection, among others (Racelis, 2008). Likewise, NGO part-
ners across the Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI)
Federation have withdrawn as capacity has been built across
the movement – stepping back to let urban community groups
take the lead in campaigning, demonstrating new building reg-
ulations and models, managing community savings and loans
funds and facilitating national and international exchanges
(Patel & Mitlin, 2002). Over time this grassroots-led move-
ment has built savings, capabilities, and leadership at the
local-level, networks at the local, national, and international
levels, and in doing so, has enabled urban poor groups to
inﬂuence government actors and service providers. Not only
have groups fought for increased access to more or better ser-
vices, but this has enabled them to do so in a way that chal-
lenges existing exclusionary or clientelistic practices (Mitlin,
2013). In Uganda, the political capabilities of farmers have
been strengthened not through NGO programs promoting
good governance (that operate within the conﬁnes of existing
liberal government spaces), but through a less formalized and
grassroots-driven process of ‘associationalization’. Supported
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gain political agency in ways that, through a process of eco-
nomic empowerment and expanding political leverage, began
to undermine patronage politics and generate political inﬂu-
ence (King, 2014).
That NGOs locate themselves as technical experts delivering
speciﬁc services leads to an unequal playing ﬁeld between them
and the communities or movements they support (Bolnick,
2008). Not so natural in this progression, therefore, is the shift
in the nature of relationships that it entails between NGOs and
other civil society groups, from unequal relationships favoring
those with power and resources to equal partnerships placing
local organizations at the center of their own priorities. As we
saw in the earlier example of the Zapatista movement in Mex-
ico, signiﬁcant tensions emerged between the movement and
support NGOs as it got stronger and argued for greater bud-
get control and a shift in programmatic focus (Andrews,
2014). Some NGOs were able and willing to adapt to these
demands. Others dropped out of the relationship because
donor restrictions on ﬁnancial reporting and programmatic
focus prevented them from being responsive to their beneﬁcia-
ries. NGOs able to prioritize downward accountability were
those with some level of ﬁnancial autonomy, 15 greater geo-
graphic and ideological proximity to the movement, and a
horizontal network of accountability from other peer NGOs
(Andrews, 2014).
Experience over the past three decades has revealed little
interest from NGOs in establishing strong connections with
social movements embedded in the political processes essential
to social change (Edwards, 2008). While some NGOs were set
up by and have managed to remain attached and accountable
to people’s movements for speciﬁc purposes, these tend to be
exceptions (Choudry & Kapoor, 2013). As with Andrews’
example above, in some cases this may be because donor
requirements prevent them from establishing equal relation-
ships. For larger NGOs, however, there is little incentive to
relinquish the powerful position in which they are currently sit-
uated. Perhaps this is unsurprising given that current patterns
of donor funding have evolved in ways that position NGOs as
leaders in solving the ‘problem’ of development and have strug-
gled to meet the requirements of those NGOs that are aligned
with demand-side struggles for improved relationships between
state and citizens (Carothers & de Gramont, 2013).
There remains, therefore, little incentive for NGOs to reori-
ent their roles away from service delivery and advocacy
toward the building of bridges that are functional to the needs
and demands of the civil society groups they aim to support.
NGOs are often thought of as a “sector”, but in reality they
and other civil society groups form part of an “ecosystem”
of diﬀerent elements and relationships in which NGOs become
part of multiple bottom-up strategies that link engagement
and advocacy in formal spaces with broader social mobiliza-
tion and coalition building eﬀorts. Crucial for NGOs and
donors alike is to reﬂect upon the position of NGOs in relation
to broader civil society. Like a natural ecosystem, civil society
gains strength and sustenance through two things: one is
diversity – so that all angles of a problem can be tackled, from
service delivery to street protest; and the other is connection,
so that the whole can be more than the sum of its parts and
synergies can be developed between diﬀerent elements. A key
challenge to NGOs, therefore, is to reﬂect on their roles within
this complex ecosystem and hierarchies as well as on how their
interventions unfold in the complex terrain of social, political,
economic, and cultural dynamics (Makuwira, 2014).
Within this ecosystem lies a variety of diﬀerent actors with
varying forms and levels of capacity, as well as varied values,goals, and power (Balboa, 2014). Fundamental here is the fact
that NGOs and membership-based organizations have very
diﬀerent political, administrative, and technical capacities for
inﬂuencing diﬀerent levels of the ecosystem, as we see in
Table 1. This may prevent most NGOs themselves from acting
as a counterbalance to dominant state and private sector inter-
ests. But NGOs are ideally placed to be “connectors” in these
ecosystems precisely because of their “intermediary” status –
the fact that they sit between diﬀerent types and levels of social
action. NGOs may not themselves be politicized organizations
composed of and accountable to members. Likewise, they may
not be actively seeking to promote a form of development that
constitutes direct social, political, and economic change.
Instead they oﬀer diﬀerent comparative strengths that are inte-
gral to assisting other forms of MBOs in realizing those capac-
ities. Mediating between diﬀerent actors, geographies, and
approaches to social change is exactly what is required as
the landscape of transformation becomes more integrated,
complex, and diverse. Across this landscape no one organiza-
tion’s actions or outcomes stand-alone – the capacity and nat-
ure of state and societal actors are outcomes of a two-way
exchange that is shaped in substantial ways by the institutional
terrain in which it takes place (Houtzager, 2005). Diﬀerences
between the global, national, and local levels are momentous,
making this form of bridging leadership essential (Balboa,
2014). The ability to inﬂuence politics and policy requires a
range of strengths and attributes that on their own MBOs
may lack, including good technical knowledge and skills, pol-
icy advocacy, broad political relationships and networks, and
legitimacy (Robinson & Friedman, 2007). All social move-
ments beneﬁt from specialist support, advice, funding and
connections of the kind that intermediaries can bring to the
table, so it is much better to build on the existing strengths
of NGOs than to ignore or apologize for them.
While the position of NGOs is being challenged by the rise
of more ﬂuid social networks and less structured or “leader-
less” organizations (think Occupy, for example, or websites
like Kiva and Kickstarter) that may reduce the need for inter-
mediaries to channel resources between one place and another
and manage the processes involved, this trend can be exagger-
ated. In fact, the role of NGOs as connectors may grow in the
future precisely because of the trend toward greater integration
that was highlighted above. Crucially, “bridges” imply equal-
ity – resting on foundations that are equal at both ends - and
reciprocity, since people and ideas cross over in both direc-
tions. The secret of success for intermediaries is to be and
act ‘in service to’ something larger than themselves and their
own, self-generated agendas – to move from control to facili-
tation and from being donors and decision-makers to co-cre-
ators and translators. The implication is that people in
diﬀerent countries, working in diﬀerent sectors, and believing
in diﬀerent things will engage with and learn from each other.
This will make for a much healthier conversation. It will also
make it easier to answer questions about legitimacy and
accountability as NGOs extend their involvement in the inter-
national system – about ‘who speaks for whom’ in emerging
regimes of transnational governance – so long as they are pre-
pared to modulate their own voices so that others can be
heard. Increasingly people will want to speak for themselves,
with NGOs in a supporting and supportive role.
That may seem like a threat to the proﬁle of NGOs (espe-
cially if they think their proﬁle impacts their ‘market share’
of resources), but in the future much more will be achieved
by working in service to broader civil society networks, since
that is where the “mass” and “energy” reside to inﬂuence
the real drivers of social change. This is a challenge that is
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organizations geographically (sitting between diﬀerent coun-
tries and levels of local–global action), institutionally (working
in the spaces between civil society, government and the mar-
ket), functionally (committed to social justice but ﬂexible in
how to realize it in practice), and philosophically (being ‘prag-
matic visionaries’ that embody their values in concrete action).
By re-positioning themselves more consciously as bridges
along these various dimensions, NGOs will be able to carry
information, ideas, skills, and funding across the ecosystems
of transformative action that are emerging in areas like climate
change and the environment, the social economy, and new
forms of civil society activism. The possibilities are exciting
for those who are prepared to accept that the landscape of
social change is evolving in ways that require shifts in the
NGO community itself, away from logical and linear models
of development to work more closely with communities and
social movements to help them grapple with and negotiate
the complexity of development as it happens (Harding, 2013;
Mitlin, 2013; Wallace & Porter, 2013). The challenge is to start
removing some of the restrictions in the international aid sys-
tem that currently make the short-term needs of support
NGOs irreconcilable with the longer term needs and strategies
of social movements and other forms of MBO.5. CONCLUSIONS
Central to the future of development NGOs – and develop-
ment more broadly – is a return to politics in the broadest
sense, and a retreat from the idea that transformation is simply
the aggregate of technical interventions (Carothers & de
Gramont, 2013; Green, 2008). In addition to the successes in
service delivery that the proliferation of NGOs has helped facil-
itate, progress has been made in recognizing the role of civil
society as a critical component of good governance agendas.
However ongoing representation of civil society as constituting
a relatively narrow band of NGOs representing moderate
points of view and lacking the membership base and politicized
methods necessary for achieving change is irreconcilable with
the need to reconﬁgure deeply rooted inequalities. Tackling
issues of power, inequality, social, and political change requires
a fundamental redress in how we conceptualize, distinguish
between and support NGOs in relation to MBOs. It is only
through mobilizing a strong membership base with internal
accountability structures that participation in program design
or political change can remain political, a process through
which MBOs seek to take an independent or oppositional
stance to the state or private interests and to leverage better
terms of recognition, resource distribution, and political inﬂu-
ence. Our criticisms are not meant to suggest that NGOs have
found themselves in this position because they are ambivalent
about tackling issues of power and politics – anything but.
But only by acknowledging, confronting and challenging the
problems that NGOs face in the international aid chain can
we move toward relationships that are more supportive of
NGO autonomy and a greater diversity of civil society action.
How can NGOs continue to expand their successes in ser-
vice delivery while returning to a stronger engagement with
the root causes of poverty that are so deeply embedded in
the systems and structures of power and politics that underlie
poverty and inequality? How can they join forces with local
MBOs as equal partners, jointly pursuing their mutual goals
of transformation and social justice? As we have seen, respon-
sibility for these changes does not lie with NGOs alone. A
quick glance at their position within the broader aid systemhighlights the diﬃcult situation in which they ﬁnd themselves,
juggling a delicate balancing act between institutional and
developmental imperatives that require close but potentially
conﬂicting relationships with states, donors, partners and con-
stituents. Moving forward in these respects will require self-
critical thinking across an international aid chain that remains
“hampered by politics, arrogance, and self-interest” (Green,
2008, p. 378). Despite advances made by donors in moving
toward more political methods for facilitating development,
these eﬀorts remain hampered given there has been little shift
in the aid chain away from a narrow conceptualization of civil
society, and few examples of their ability to design more inno-
vative funding mechanisms to support, rather than erode, the
political roots of civil society organizations (Carothers & de
Gramont, 2013).
In the meantime, we are faced with the ongoing reality that
in those dimensions that are most important for long-lasting,
structural change, NGOs remain ill-equipped to intervene.
The gradual erosion of their civil society roots and their inabil-
ity to secure ‘development alternatives’ at any scale means that
NGOs remain unable to engage with transformative agendas
that seek large-scale redistribution and the re-ordering of
wealth and privilege. As potential ‘bridges to the future,’
NGOs could play an inﬂuential role in a post-aid world, which
will surely witness a rebalancing of the relationships between
governments, markets, and citizens in service to these goals.
But such bridges represent a diﬀerent and less dominant com-
ponent of the local-to-global civil society infrastructures that
are emerging. Adopting these new roles will challenge the iden-
tity of NGOs and their willingness to be judged by criteria
other than their own size and proﬁle. As we concluded in
World Development in 1996, if NGOs remain “Too Close for
Comfort” they are unlikely to respond creatively to this chal-
lenge, but by distancing themselves from their dependence on
governments and donors they at least have the chance of
becoming partners in the transformation of society.
Without being able to ‘return to their roots’ by blending the
old with the new and adopting new tools and approaches in
innovative ways, NGOs will remain unable to pursue transfor-
mative agendas that seek to address the wider systems that cre-
ate and reproduce poverty and inequality. Development as a
project-based and professional activity has yet to ﬁnd a way
to confront the dominance of established elites and corporate
interests. In a context of vast and widening political and eco-
nomic inequality, NGOs do and will continue to struggle
because of their non-political roots and strategies. Govern-
ment–NGO partnerships and the subsequent ‘transformation
by stealth’ is one means through which NGOs strive for more
transformative forms of service delivery, but other forms of
institutional advocacy remain blocked by the limited civil soci-
ety space aﬀorded to them by states and donors. A shift
toward a stronger, more inter-connected civil society in which
NGOs play a key bridging role between MBOs, local and
national governments and transnational may be the way for-
ward. But it is easy, too, to over-romanticize the capacity of
civil society organizations – including both NGOs and MGOs
– against such powerful actors and systems. Understanding
the autonomy and agency of these actors (and how these
can be enhanced) is therefore a question that should be asked
at every level of the international aid chain. A research agenda
moving forward could help us to foster a deeper understand-
ing of relationships between NGOs and the MBOs that they
support, including the factors that lead to deeper engagement
with beneﬁciaries, a greater commitment to inward account-
ability, and a participatory approach that does not lead to
its depoliticization.
716 WORLD DEVELOPMENTNOTES1. For those wanting to follow the blog, the newspaper article, and the
comments that these generated, Duncan’s blog can be found at: http://
www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=11330and the Guardian article at: http://
www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/aug/
17/faultline-ngos-future-development (both accessed 12/12/2013).
2. Many writers still identify ‘neoliberalism’ as the process that is driving
global inequality but things are more complicated than in the late 20th
century with several varieties of capitalism now competing and collabo-
rating in processes of economic globalization.
3. Of course, these questions about NGOs and their impact are also
being asked by NGOs themselves, but often behind closed doors. Some are
increasingly vocal about the problems they face in contributing to
“progressive social change” given the constraints that are placed on them
by current patterns of politics and foreign aid (see for example Shutt, 2009;
Progressive Development Forum, 2012).
4. NGOs whose missions are conﬁned to service delivery (such as
humanitarian organizations) and do not display transformative missions
of empowerment and social justice cannot be measured by this same
yardstick, nor can be criticized for their activities of not contesting the
state when this is not within their speciﬁed goals or missions.
5. By bringing in large sums of external ﬁnancing, donors replace the
psychosocial rewards that incentivize group leadership with material
incentives, elite status and professional positions, eroding members’ trust
in their leaders’ motivations and facilitating exit from the group (Bano,
2008, 2012).
6. NGOs with better downward accountability and commitment to
beneﬁciaries, or more powerful NGOs that have some level of voice vis-a`-
vis donors are more likely to suspend the relationship or try to negotiate a
way to continue accessing funding without risking such change in
organizational identity (AbouAssi, 2012). We return to opportunities for
NGOs to carve out space and autonomy later in the paper.
7. In comparison with traditional donors, private foreign aid appears to
be more aligned with humanitarian principles. In a study of the allocation
of US-based private foreign aid Buete, Major, and de Mello e Souza
(2012) ﬁnd that NGOs allocate their funding on the basis of humanitarian
need rather than materialist concerns.8. Early in the program criticism arose regarding a lack of civil society
involvement in project implementation, generating a restructuring that
called for community groups to apply for grants to pursue their own
development programs (Brown et al., 2007a).
9. Gauri and Galef (2005) explore the convergence of development
NGOs to a modal institutional form in more detail, highlighting the
role of material incentives and the pressures they face toward
conformity.10. Only two of the six Indonesian NGOs explored were prepared to
resort to more political forms of advocacy if their eﬀorts were unsuccess-
ful. Preventing this were fears that donors would not approve this strategy
and that it would run the risk of damaging the trust they had established
with the government (Kamstra et al., 2013).11. A break-down of the funding activities of 703 foundations funding
human rights activities in 2010 ﬁnds that of the grants totaling $1.2 billion,
only 3% was allocated to programs for civil and political participation
(and 90% of this was granted to organizations promoting this in North
America) (The Foundation Centre, 2013).12. A Special Edition of Public Administration and Development (31(4)
2011) explores the relationship between NGOs and governments across
diverse sectors in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.
13. Despite positive conclusions when it comes to research into NGO–
Government partnerships, research in this sector also highlights the
importance not to overstate the degree of change when it comes to the
space NGOs are allowed or can carve out: changes have been modest, slow
to take root, and remain fragile (Brautigam & Segarra, 2007; Brass,
2012b).
14. We would like to thank Sheela Patel for articulating this point so
succinctly at a public lecture at the University of Manchester on
‘Segregation, social equity and the 21st Century (27th February 2013).
15. Alternative sources of funding through membership dues, product
sales, speaking programs, or ﬁnding grants and donors oﬀer more ﬂexible
funds that can support a cause rather than speciﬁc pre-deﬁned outputs
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